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ABSTRACT 
Accurately testing for consciousness is still an unsolved problem 
when applied to humans and other mammals. The inherent 
subjective nature of conscious experience makes it virtually 
unreachable to classic empirical approaches. Therefore, 
alternative strategies based on behavior analysis and 
neurobiological studies are being developed in order to determine 
the level of consciousness of biological organisms. However, 
these methods cannot be directly applied to artificial systems. In 
this paper we propose both a taxonomy and some functional 
criteria that can be used to assess the level of consciousness of an 
artificial intelligent agent. Furthermore, a list of measurable levels 
of artificial consciousness, ConsScale, is defined as a tool to 
determine the potential level of consciousness of an agent. Both 
the mapping of consciousness to AI and the role of consciousness 
in cognition are controversial and unsolved questions, in this 
paper we aim to approach these issues with the notions of I-
Consciousness and embodied intelligence.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.2 [Artificial Intelligence]: General – cognitive simulation, 
philosophical foundations.  
General Terms 
Design, Theory. 
Keywords 
Machine Consciousness, Artificial Consciousness, cognitive 
agents, Cognitive Modeling.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Determining the level of consciousness of a living organism is a 
hard problem. One could think that some sort of Turing test  
might be a plausible solution [31]. It is indeed what we do 
everyday when we perceive other subjects as conscious beings. 
These kinds of test that we are used to perform unconsciously are 
based on verbal report and observed behavior. We perceive other 
humans acting as if they were conscious and thus we infer they 
actually are. However, we do not have any scientific proof that 
others experiment any subjective life because we cannot perceive 
it directly [15]. Therefore, from a pure scientific point of view, 
zombies (organisms behaving as conscious beings but without any 
inner feeling) are conceivable, although probably not possible [7].  
Some approaches have been proposed in order to overcome the 
issue of scientific proof of consciousness. From a philosophical 
standpoint, Dennett has proposed the heterophenomenology 
method, which consists on the application of the scientific method 
to both third-person behavior analysis and first-person self report 
[10]. From the neuroscience perspective, Seth, Baars and 
Edelman propose a set of criteria for consciousness in humans and 
other mammals [29]. A number of these criteria are based on 
neurobiological aspects. If the neuronal structures and the 
associated activity pattern that gives place to consciousness are 
identified, then we can look for them in animals endowed with a 
central nervous system [5]. Analogously, if some behavior 
patterns are identified as uniquely produced by a conscious 
subject, we can design experiments where these behaviors are 
tested. However, when it comes to artificial agents, most of the 
assumptions mentioned above cannot be directly applied. The 
following are the main reasons why we think the former criteria 
should not be used for evaluating artificial agents: 
• Artificial agents have different underlying machinery. At 
the biological level, behavior of mammals is controlled by 
the endocrine and nervous systems. Even though some 
artificial agents are inspired or try to simulate the biological 
nervous system, their design is quite far from a realistic 
emulation. Therefore, it does not make sense, for instance, to 
look for a strong connection between thalamus and cortex as 
a possible sign of an underlying mechanism for 
consciousness in an artificial implementation (given the case 
that the implementation under study is endowed with a 
simulated thalamocortical structure).   
• Artificial agent’s behavior produces different patterns. 
Moving the observer’s point of view from the biological 
level to the behavioral level, human behavior can be seen as 
regulated by cultural rules. Human ontogeny gives place to 
different behavioral patterns as a subject develops situated in 
a cultural environment. Given that the development of 
artificial agents differs from that, their behavior should not 
be analyzed following the same criteria that are applied to 
humans. 
• Lack of verbal report. This is one of the key differences 
between human’s behavior and artificial agents’ behavior. 
Accurate verbal report (AVR) is probably the main way we 
can find out about the inner life experienced by a human 
subject. Given the lack of this kind of communication skills 
in artificial systems, AVR as we know it cannot be used to 
evaluate artificial agents. 
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Taking into account the reasons mentioned above and the fact that 
human culture strongly determine the production of consciousness 
in humans [6], we argue that the kind of consciousness that could 
be potentially produced in artificial agents would be of a different 
nature (although we think it still could be called consciousness, 
i.e. machine consciousness or artificial consciousness). 
Consequently, we believe that criteria for machine consciousness 
should be studied from the perspective of a specifically defined 
taxonomy of artificial agents. Even though some of the classes of 
artificial agents defined in this taxonomy cannot be directly 
compared with a corresponding example of biological organisms, 
both biological phylogenetic and human ontogenetic analogies 
can often be used to better understand the level of consciousness 
that can be associated to a particular class of agents, e.g. [16].  
In the next section we aim to provide a comprehensive description 
of the main aspects of consciousness and their basic roles in 
cognition. Additionally, we redefine the dimensions of 
consciousness in terms of artificial intelligent agents, and 
therefore we characterize machine consciousness by analyzing the 
fundamental building blocks required in an agent’s architecture in 
order to produce the functionality associated with consciousness. 
Subsequently, in section 3, we discuss key particular functions of 
consciousness and their interaction in agent’s cognitive processes. 
In section 4, we have taken into account both the key functions of 
consciousness and agent’s basic architectural features to propose a 
taxonomy for artificial agents, where a concrete level of machine 
consciousness is assigned to each agent category. Section 5 
provides a framework for classifying agents under the light of the 
proposed taxonomy. Finally, we conclude in section 6 with a brief 
discussion of current state of the art in terms of our proposed 
taxonomy.  
2. CHARACTERIZING MACHINE 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Setting aside the discussion about whether or not a categorical 
implementation of an artificial form of consciousness is possible, 
we have adopted an incremental approach in which we consider 
that certain aspects of consciousness can be successfully modeled 
in artificial agents; while other aspects might be still out of the 
reach given the current state of the art in the field of machine 
consciousness. In this scenario, we need to define which are the 
conceptual building blocks integrated in a possible machine 
consciousness implementation. Then we could test the presence of 
these functional components and their interrelation within a given 
system in order to assess its potential level of machine 
consciousness. However, the definition of these components 
would require a complete understanding of ‘natural’ 
consciousness, and given that the quest for consciousness has not 
yet come to a successful end, a more modest framework has to be 
established in the realm of artificial systems. But, what are the 
components of consciousness that we are not able to explain or 
concretely define so far? We need to decompose, or at least 
conceptually decouple consciousness dimensions in order to be 
able to answer this question.  
2.1 The Dimensions of Consciousness 
An extremely complex phenomenon like consciousness can be 
seen as a whole, or more conveniently, it can be analyzed as if it 
was composed of two interrelated dimensions. A conceptual 
division can be outlined when a distinction is made between 
phenomenology and access [6]. While the access dimension (A-
Consciousness) refers to the accessibility of mind contents for 
conscious reasoning and volition, phenomenology (P-
Consciousness) is related to the subjective experience or qualia, 
i.e. how does it feel to be thinking about something, or what is it 
like to be someone else, as Nagel would formulate it [20]. 
Understanding how P-Consciousness is produced by biological 
organisms is a controversial problem usually regarded as the 
explanatory gap [17], which still remains to be closed (if ever 
possible). While the access dimension of consciousness has an 
obvious function, namely guiding conscious reason and action; 
the phenomenal dimension lacks a generally accepted function 
(see [6] and [8] for a detailed discussion on the matter). Qualia 
could be just a side effect produced by access mechanisms, or it 
could play a key role in the integration of multimodal perception 
[27]. What is generally accepted is that rather than binary 
properties, both access and phenomenal aspects of consciousness 
come in various degrees. Therefore, we think it is possible to 
represent a range of degrees of consciousness in a bi-dimensional 
space defined by phenomenal and access dimensions (see Figure 
1). The access dimension represents the informational aspect of 
consciousness, while the phenomenal dimension represents the 
associated ‘what-is-it-like-ness’.  
 
Figure 1. Consciousness bi-dimensional space in biological 
phylogenics. 
The questions of having A-Consciousness without P-
Consciousness and vice versa are typically controversial issues in 
the study of consciousness. In the present work, we have adopted 
the assumption that machine consciousness and ‘biological’ 
consciousness are actually different phenomena. Therefore, 
different kinds of consciousness could be present in artificial 
agents, and these new versions of machine consciousness could 
follow different rules in terms of the conceptual link between A-
Consciousness and P-Consciousness. While we assume that both 
A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness increase uniformly at the 
same rate in biological phylogeny (as depicted in Figure 1), we 
consider that all combinations are a priori possible in artificial 
agents. We believe that the evolutionary forces involved in the 
design of biological organisms have always produced functionally 
coherent machinery; hence zombies or P-Unconscious (A-
Consciousness without P-Consciousness) and A-Unconscious (P-
Consciousness without A-Consciousness) do not naturally exist. 
Nevertheless, there exist cases of individuals that after suffering 
cerebral vascular accidents or traumatic brain injury become P-
Unconscious or A-Unconscious in some respects and degrees. For 
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instance, brain-injured patients who have developed 
prosopagnosia are unable to consciously recognize faces despite 
being able to recognize any other visual stimuli. Even though 
prosopagnosic patients are unable to experience any feeling of 
familiarity at the view of faces of their closest relatives (loss of P-
Consciousness), other cognitive operations are still performed 
with the perceived faces – a covert face recognition takes place – 
but their output fails to reach consciousness (a disorder of A-
Consciousness). However, some A-Consciousness capability 
remains in many patients as they are usually able to implicitly 
access to knowledge derived from ‘P-Unconsciously’ 
unrecognized faces [28]. 
It is also important to distinguish between consciousness as it is 
applied to creatures and consciousness as it is applied to mental 
states [19]. Essentially, a conscious subject can have conscious 
and unconscious mental states. In the prosopagnosia example 
discussed above, conscious individuals fail to have P-
Consciousness of faces at view and their A-Consciousness is also 
impaired to that respect. However, these subjects can perfectly be 
A-Conscious and P-Conscious of the voice and speech of their 
relatives or any other person. In this paper, we generally refer to 
creature consciousness, hence evaluating the potential level of 
consciousness of individuals as per their ability to have P-
Conscious and A-Conscious states. The particular contents of the 
mental states will be analyzed later as part of the method to 
establish a taxonomy for machine consciousness. 
2.2 A Computational Approach to 
Consciousness in Intelligent Agents 
The possible functionality of P-Consciousness and the possibility 
of effectively having one dimension of consciousness without 
another remain unanswered questions. Therefore, the interrelation 
between access and phenomenology remains highly unclear and 
controversial. Some authors even consider P-Consciousness as an 
epiphenomenal process, hence independent of behavior (see for 
instance [32], while others tend to identify a key functional role in 
qualia [21].  
Following a pure computational approach we could consider both 
A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness as being the same 
functional process, thus neglecting the possibility of subjective 
experience in artificial agents. However, we think that a different 
dimensional decomposition is to be made in the realm of machine 
consciousness (see Figure 2). Although the nature and required 
underlying machinery for qualia are not known, we believe that 
some functional characterization of P-Consciousness can be 
made. Therefore, we have adopted a functional point of view, in 
which we introduce a redefined dimension of consciousness 
called Integrative Consciousness (I-Consciousness). In our 
conception of machine consciousness, we have taken the 
assumption that I-Consciousness represents the functional aspect 
of P-Consciousness that exists in conscious biological organisms. 
In order to characterize consciousness as a property of agents we 
need to formally define the basic components of an artificial 
situated agent. Such an agent interacts with the environment by 
retrieving information both from its own body and from its 
surroundings, processing it, and acting accordingly. Following 
Wooldridge’s definition of abstract architectures for intelligent 
agents [33], and taking into account the embodiment aspect of 
situated agents, we have identified a set of essential architectural 
modules: sensors, sensorimotor coordination, internal state, and 
effectors. These modules implement the following processes: 
perception, reason, and action. Consequently, the following 
abstract architectural components can be identified: 
• Body (B). Embodiment is a key feature of a situated agent 
[11]. Agent’s body can be physical or software simulated (as 
well as its environment). A boundary is established between 
agent’s body and its environment (E). The rest of 
components are usually located within this boundary. We 
believe that it is important to make a distinction between 
agent’s body (or plant if we take a control theory standpoint) 
and the environment, as the first is directly controlled while 
the latter is indirectly controlled. The definition of the body 
of an agent is important as it determines what sensors it can 
use, how its effectors work, and ultimately how its 
perception and behavior is affected by its physical 
embodiment. Owning an active body is essential for the 
acquisition of consciousness. 
• Sensory Machinery (S). Agent’s sensors are in charge of 
retrieving information from the environment (exteroceptive 
sensors) or from the agent’s own body (propioceptive 
sensors). 
• Action Machinery (A). In order to interact with the 
environment the agent uses its effectors. Agent’s behavior is 
composed of the actions ultimately performed by this 
machinery. 
• Sensorimotor Coordination Machinery (R). From purely 
reactive agents to deliberative ones, the sensorimotor 
coordination module is in charge of producing a concrete 
behavior as a function of both external stimuli and internal 
agent’s state. 
• Memory (M). Internal agent’s state is represented both by its 
own structure and stored information. Memory is the mean to 
store both perceived information and new generated 
knowledge. We consider that even agents that do not 
maintain state can be said to have a minimal state 
represented by its own structure, i.e. preprogrammed 
sensorimotor coordination rules.  
As Wooldridge has pointed out [33], different classes of agents 
could be obtained depending on the concrete implementation of 
the abstract architecture. Following the notation that we have 
adopted, we could say that different sensorimotor coordination 
functions give place to different classes of agents. For instance, 
reactive agents or BDI agents [23]. While sensorimotor 
coordination of reactive agents is characterized by a direct 
mapping from situation to action, BDI agents decision making is 
based on internal state representing beliefs, desires, and 
intentions.  
In computational terms, consciousness can be regarded as a 
unique sequential thread that integrates concurrent multimodal 
sensory information and coordinates voluntary action. Hence, 
consciousness is closely related with sensorimotor coordination. 
Our aim is to establish a classification of agents according to the 
realization of the functions of consciousness in the framework of 
agent’s sensorimotor coordination. 
 
Figure 2. Machine Consciousness bi-dimensional space. 
According to the Global Workspace Theory [4], loads of 
information are acquired by the senses continuously, and many 
interim coalitions of specialized processors run concurrently 
collaborating and competing for space in the working memory, 
which is the arena where the serial mechanism of attention selects 
the contents that will be conscious at any given time. In this 
scenario, A-Consciousness refers to the accessibility of contents 
for their usage in conscious processing. In accordance with the 
Global Access Hypothesis [3], the output of unconscious 
processors, like for instance a face recognition module, can be 
accessed by other processors, and be finally used to form the 
conscious contents of the mind. Baars argues that the aggregation 
of processors is produced by the application of contexts. 
However, access is not the only feature that is required to form a 
conscious experience. Coherent context criteria need to be 
selected and applied adaptively. We argue that I-Consciousness is 
the mechanism that allows the formation of coherent contents of 
consciousness. 
A coherent content of consciousness is one that provides a desired 
functionality which successfully adapts to current environment 
situation. For example, given the access to the recognition of a 
face, a conscious content should be formed including a feeling of 
familiarity (or a familiarity flag setting aside the phenomenal 
dimension) if the face belongs to a known person. This is a 
desired functionality for a social agent, and the access property 
alone cannot provide it. Basically, we argue that I-Conscious 
dimension of machine consciousness represents the functionality 
that caused qualia to be selected by evolution in biological 
organisms.  
3. FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
As mentioned above, the question of what do qualia do in 
biological organisms is a controversial one. In this paper we 
propose that a naturalistic approach on the origin of consciousness 
can be applied to machine consciousness, and therefore identify 
the functions that can render an agent conscious (in the sense of 
Artificial Consciousness). In a vast ocean of information where 
A-Consciousness provides access to virtually any content of the 
agent’s mind, I-Consciousness provides the mechanism for the 
emergence of a unique and coherent story out of the chaos. This 
story is the stream of consciousness, the metaphorical movie that 
is playing within our heads. As Dennett has pointed out [10], the 
process of making this narrative could be based on a kind of 
pandemonium, where different narrative versions suffer 
reiterative edition and review until they are presented as the 
official published content of the mind, i.e. they become conscious 
contents of the mind.  
In order to determine the functionality that has to be included as 
part of I-Consciousness we have analyzed the very basic functions 
that need to be considered in the making of a story out of sensory 
information. Note that different functions can be considered 
depending on the problem domain, agent physical capabilities, 
and internal state representation richness. In fact, each specific 
class of organism is designed to perceive different realities from 
the world, thus limiting what can be available to consciousness. 
For instance, while some animals (including humans) have the 
ability to perceive social relations, other animals endowed with 
similar senses are unable to internally represent such complex 
percepts.  
In this work, we have adopted the assumption that single modality 
percepts acquired by the agent are combined using 
contextualization in order to form complex multimodal percepts 
[2]. Understanding how this process is performed in the brain, 
subsequently giving place to a unique version (or story) of 
conscious perception is known as the binding problem [25]. From 
a machine consciousness perspective, the binding problem is 
solved functionally by applying a contextualization mechanism. 
This contextualization process alone can generate multiple 
complex percepts. However, it is the combination of A-
Consciousness and I-Consciousness which permits the 
construction of coherent and adaptive complex percepts. The set 
of finally accepted percepts form a unique and coherent stream of 
consciousness, which the agent exploits to develop other higher 
level cognitive functions.  
Out of the set of cognitive functions that an intelligent agent could 
potentially exhibit, the following list of functions specifically 
characterizes the behavior of a conscious agent: Theory of Mind 
(ToM) and Executive Function (EF). ToM is the ability to 
attribute mental states to oneself and others. From a human 
developmental standpoint, Lewis suggests four stages in the 
acquisition of ToM: (1) “I know”, (2) “I know I know”, (3) “I 
know you know”, and finally (4) “I know you know I know” [18]. 
The term EF includes all the processes responsible for higher 
level action control, in particular those that are necessary for 
maintaining a mentally specified goal and for implementing that 
goal in the face of distracting alternatives [22]. Attention is an 
essential feature of EF. It represents the ability of the agent to 
direct its perception and action, i.e. selecting the contents of the 
working memory out of the entire mind’s accessible content. 
Planning, coordination, and set shifting (the ability to move back 
and forth between tasks) are also key processes included in EF. 
We argue that the integration of all of these cognitive functions 
could build an artificial conscious mind. However, each of the 
mentioned functions could also be implemented independently or 
partly integrated with other cognitive functions, thus giving place 
to different levels of implementation of artificial consciousness as 
discussed in the next section.  
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4. LEVELS OF MACHINE 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Table 1 describes ConsScale, which is a list of potential levels of 
consciousness for artificial agents. This scale has been defined in 
terms of reference agent abstract architectures and characteristic 
behaviors. The characteristic behavior assigned to each level has 
been derived from the functionality of consciousness discussed 
above. As illustrative analogy, machine consciousness levels are 
assigned a comparable level of consciousness in biological 
phylogenics and human ontogeny. 
The first level in the scale, Disembodied, refers to a ‘proto-agent’ 
and serves as an initial reference that remarks the importance of a 
defined body as a requirement for defining a situated agent. The 
rest of the scale comprises a set of twelve ranks, where lower 
levels are subsumed by higher ones. Therefore, each stage of the 
incremental development of an artificial agent could be identified 
by a concrete level. Levels 0 and 1, Isolated and Decontrolled 
respectively, are also conceptual references which help 
characterize situatedness in terms of the relation with the 
environment. Both classes represent inert bodies lacking any 
functionality or interaction with the medium except the inevitable 
derived from the physical properties of their inactive bodies. 
Therefore, these classes cannot be defined as situated agents. 
Level 2, Reactive, defines a classical reactive agent which lacks 
any explicit memory or learning capabilities. From level 2 
onwards the agents make use of the environment as the mean to 
close the feedback loop between action and perception. Hence, all 
agent types above level 1 can be regarded as situated agents. 
Although we are explicitly focusing in individual agent 
evaluation, it is important to note that additional learning or 
adaptation processes could exist at an evolutionary plane 
(assuming that agents are able to replicate, mutate, and evolve). 
For instance, although reactive rules are fixed for a level 2 
individual, adaptation of reactive responses in a population of 
agents could take place over the generations.  
Level 3, Rational, can be identified as the simplest form of a 
classical deliberative agent. At this level, the agent’s internal state 
is maintained by a memory system and sensorimotor coordination 
is a function of both perceived and remembered information. 
Propioceptive sensing can be present at this level; however, it is 
not producing any self-awareness. The next level, Attentional, is 
characterized by an attention mechanism, which allow the agent 
to select specific contents both from the sensed and stored state 
information. 
 
Table 1. Artificial Agents Consciousness Scale (ConsScale) 
Level of Machine 
Consciousness Agent Architecture Short Description Characteristic Behavior 
Biological 
Phylogeny 
Human 
Ontogeny 
Level -1 
Disembodied 
Boundaries of the agent 
are not well defined. It can 
be confounded with the 
environment. 
None. It is not a situated 
agent. 
Amino acid as 
part of a 
protein. 
n/a 
Level 0 
Isolated 
Obvious distinction 
between body and 
environment, but no 
autonomous processing. 
None. It is not a situated 
agent. 
Isolated 
chromosome. n/a 
Level 1 
Decontrolled 
Presence of sensors and/or 
actuators, but no relation 
between them. 
None. It is not a situated 
agent. Dead bacteria n/a 
Level 2 
Reactive 
Fixed reactive responses. 
R establishes an output of 
A as a predetermined 
function of S. 
No higher function. 
Primitive situatedness 
based on reflexes. 
Virus n/a 
Level 3 
Rational 
Actions are a dynamic 
function of both memory 
and current information 
acquired by S. 
Basic ability to learn and 
propioceptive sensing 
allow orientation and 
positioning behavior. 
Earthworm 1 Month. 
Level 4 
Attentional 
Attention mechanism 
selects Ei contents from S 
and M. Primitive 
emotions. 
Ability to direct attention 
toward selected Ei allows 
attack and escape 
behaviors. 
Fish 5 Months. 
Level 5 
Executive 
Multiple goals can be 
interleaved as they are 
explicitly represented in 
memory.  
Set shifting capability 
allows multiple goal 
achievement. Basic 
emotional learning. 
Quadruped 
mammal 9 Months. 
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Level 6 
Emotional 
Stable and complex 
emotions. Support for 
ToM stage 1: “I know”. 
Complex emotions provide 
a self-status assessment 
and influence behavior. 
Monkey 1 Year. 
Level 7 
Self-Conscious 
Support for ToM stage 2: 
“I know I know”. 
Self-reference makes 
possible advanced 
planning. Use of tools. 
Monkey 1.5 Years. 
Level 8 
Empathic 
Support for ToM stage 3: 
“I know you know”. Making of tools. Chimpanzee 2 Years. 
Level 9 
Social 
Support for ToM stage 4: 
“I know you know I 
know”. 
Linguistic capabilities. 
Able to develop a culture. Human 4 Years. 
Level 10 
Human-Like 
Human like consciousness. 
Adapted Environment 
(Ec). 
Accurate verbal report. 
Behavior modulated by 
culture (Ec). 
Human Adult 
Level 11 
Super-Conscious 
Several streams of 
consciousness in one self. 
Ability to synchronize and 
coordinate several streams 
of consciousness. 
n/a n/a 
A level 5 agent, Executive, includes a more complex internal state 
representation, which provides set shifting capabilities. The 
achievement of multiple goals is sought thanks to a higher 
coordination mechanism that shifts attention from one task to 
another. Level 6, Emotional, is the first level in which an agent 
can be to certain extend regarded as conscious in the sense of self-
awareness. The main characteristic of this level is the support for 
ToM stage 1, “I know”. Complex emotions are built as a 
combination of basic emotions and they are not only used to 
evaluate external objects but to assess the internal agent status. 
Level 7, Self-Conscious, corresponds to the emergence of self-
consciousness. At this level the agent is able to develop higher 
order thoughts [26], i.e. thoughts about thoughts, and more 
specifically thoughts about itself. Consequently it presents 
support for ToM stage 2, “I know I know”. Progressing to the next 
level, Empathic, the internal representation of the agent is 
enriched by inter-subjectivity. In addition to the model of the self, 
others are also seen as selves; hence, they are consequently 
assigned a model of subjectivity. This is the seed for a complex 
social interaction. The next step is represented by level 9, Social, 
where ToM is fully supported. Level 10, Human-Like, represents 
the sort of agent that is endowed with the same level of 
consciousness as a healthy adult human has. Therefore, the 
formation of a complex culture is a feature of this level. Finally, 
level 11 or Super-Conscious, refers to a kind of agent able to 
internally manage several streams of consciousness, while 
coordinating a single body and physical attention. A mechanism 
for coordination between the streams and synchronized access to 
physical resources would be required at this level.  
5. CLASSIFYING AGENTS USING 
ConsScale 
The levels of artificial consciousness defined in ConsScale are 
characterized by abstract architectural components and agent’s 
behavior. The architecture components represent functional 
modules whose integration makes possible the emergence of a 
characteristic behavior. Therefore, at least one behavior-based test 
can be associated to each level in order to assess if a particular 
Ec 
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agent fulfills the minimum required behavioral pattern for that 
level. In fact, an agent can only be assigned a concrete level if and 
only if it is able to show the behavioral pattern of that level as 
well as the behavioral patterns of all lower levels, e.g. even 
though an agent is able to pass ConsScale level 7 behavior test, it 
does not necessarily imply that it can be regarded as Self-
Conscious in terms of ConsScale. It would also need to comply 
with all lower levels. 
As discussed above, the three first reference levels (Disembodied, 
Isolated, and Decontrolled) are a special case as they do not 
actually describe situated agents. Therefore, there are no 
behavioral tests associated to any of these first three levels. A 
given agent could be assigned either of these initial reference 
levels just by analyzing its architectural components. In contrast, 
from level 2 onwards a characteristic behavior pattern is defined 
per ConsScale level. This characteristic pattern should be taken as 
the base of any behavior test that can be assigned to a particular 
level. Reference behavior patterns for levels 2 to 11 are discussed 
below.  
The characteristic behavior of level 2, Reactive, is the reflex, 
hence an agent able to autonomously react to any given 
environment situation is said to comply with level 2. When the 
response to a given environment state is not fixed, but it is a 
function of both the information acquired by S and agent’s 
internal state, then the agent is said to comply with level 3, 
Rational (note that some propioceptive sensing mechanism is 
required to make agent’s internal state available in R, so it can be 
an input of the sensorimotor coordination function). Most BDI-
type agents ([23]) could be classified as level 3 in terms of 
ConsScale. 
If the agent is able to direct attention to a selected subset of the 
environment state (Ei) while other environmental variables are 
also sensed but ignored in R, and the selected perception is 
evaluated in terms of agent’s goals so subsequent responses are 
adapted (primitive emotions), then the agent is said to comply 
with level 4, Attentional. Level 4 agents are able to show specific 
attack or escape behaviors and trial and error learning. The ability 
to pay attention toward specific objects or events gives place to 
the formation of directed behavior, i.e. agent can develop 
behaviors clearly related to specific targets, like following or 
running away. Additionally, level 4 agents can have primitive 
emotion mechanisms in the sense that the objects to which 
attention is paid are elementally evaluated as positive or negative. 
A positive emotion triggers decrease of distance behavior or 
bonding to selected object, while negative emotion triggers 
increase of distance and reinforcement of boundaries toward 
selected object [9]. 
If an agent that can be successfully classified as Attentional in 
terms of ConsScale also exhibits set shifting and basic emotional 
learning capabilities, then it can be regarded as Executive 
(ConsScale level 5). In addition to advanced planning, emotional 
learning is another characteristic that can be observed in some 
degree at this level, as the most emotionally rewarding tasks are 
assigned more time and effort. 
By basic emotional learning we mean that the agent is able to 
learn basic rules from one task and adapt its behavior 
consequently in the performance of that particular task. In 
contrast, Emotional (ConsScale level 6) agents are characterized 
by complex emotions and complex emotional learning. This 
means that the agent generalizes the learned lessons to its general 
behavior, furthermore, emotions are also assigned to the self and 
self-status monitoring and evaluation gives place to a sense of “I 
know” (support for ToM stage 1). Even though a representation of 
the self is considered as an input of the sensorimotor coordination 
function, this is an implicit symbol. However, level 7 (Self-
Conscious) is described by an explicit symbol for the self, which 
enables self-recognition. The reference behavior test for this level 
would be the mirror test, which although originally applied to 
primates [13], has also been adapted to other mammals and even 
artificial agents. Takeno et al. have proposed a specific 
experiment design to test whether a robot is able to recognize its 
own image reflected in a mirror [30]. Planning capabilities are 
extended as the self is integrated both in the current state 
representation and future state estimation. Behavior at this level is 
also illustrated by the ability to use tools (see for instance [1]). 
ConsScale Level 8 (Empathic) is achieved by an agent when it 
shows that it maintains a model of others, and therefore it 
collaborates accordingly with other agents in the pursuit of a 
common goal. In fact, joint goals require this, and the need for 
socially aware plans in BDI agents has been considered some 
time ago [24]. 
In level 9, Social, the internal model of other selves is enhanced 
with a full support of ToM. This means that characteristic 
behavior of this level is defined by sophisticated Machiavellian 
strategies (or social intelligence) involving social behaviors like 
lying, cunning, and leadership. In other words, an agent A could 
be aware that another agent B could be aware of A’s beliefs, 
intentions, and desires. Advanced communication skills are the 
characterization of this level behavior, where, for the first time, an 
agent would be able to purposely tell lies. There exist 
mathematical models of the dynamics of Machiavellian 
intelligence that could be used to test these sort of behaviors with 
artificial agents [14]. 
While, the obvious test for level 10, Human-Like, is the Turing 
test [31], also accurate communications skills (language) and the 
creation of a culture would be a clear feature of level 10. Other 
key characteristics are that the agent is able to profoundly modify 
its environment and society. The fluidity between social and 
technical intelligence permits the extension of its own knowledge 
using external media (like written communication) and 
technological advances are also possible. 
Finally, we cannot envisage any conclusive behavior test for level 
11 due to the lack of known exemplifying references.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed ConsScale as a machine consciousness 
taxonomy for artificial agents, which can be used as a conceptual 
framework for evaluating the potential level of consciousness of a 
given agent. Most of current implementations of artificial agents 
fall between levels 2 and 4 inclusive. The classification of any 
current implementation as fully belonging to level 5 could be 
thoughtfully discussed elsewhere; nonetheless, we think these 
kinds of agents are within current technology possibilities. 
Identifying consciousness by means of interpreting behavior 
remains an open problem that is being currently addressed 
primarily in mammals, cephalopods, and birds [12, 29]. However, 
more effort should be put in the domain of artificial agents.  
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